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According to a widespread but implicit thesis in Bayesian confirmation
theory, two confirmation measures are considered equivalent if they are ordi-
nally equivalent — call this the “ordinal equivalence thesis” (OET). I argue
that adopting OET has significant costs. First, adopting OET renders one
incapable of determining whether a piece of evidence substantially favors one
hypothesis over another. Second, OET must be rejected if merely ordinal
conclusions are to be drawn from the expected value of a confirmation mea-
sure. Furthermore, several arguments and applications of confirmation mea-
sures given in the literature already rely on a rejection of OET. I also contrast
OET with stronger equivalence theses and show that they do not have the
same costs as OET. On the other hand, adopting a thesis stronger than OET
has costs of its own, since a rejection of OET ostensibly implies that people’s
epistemic states have a very fine-grained quantitative structure. However, I
suggest that the normative upshot of the paper in fact has a conditional form,




According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E confirms hypothesis H rela-
tive to background theory K if and only if PrK(H|E) > PrK(H).1,2,3 This criterion
suffices to answer the qualitative question of whether or not E confirms H, but it
does not answer the quantitative question of how much E confirms H, nor does it
answer the comparative question of which of two confirmed hypotheses is confirmed
more by E. To answer the quantitative and comparative questions, one must adopt
a confirmation measure that quantifies the degree to which E confirms H. The fol-
lowing are just a few of the confirmation measures that have been suggested in the
literature:
The plain ratio measure, r(H,E) = Pr(H|E)
Pr(H)
The log-ratio measure, lr(H,E) = log r(H,E)4
The difference measure, d(H,E) = Pr(H|E)− Pr(H)
The log-likelihood measure, l(H,E) = log Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|¬H)
The alternative difference measure, s(H,E) = Pr(H|E)− Pr(H|¬E)5
The Kemeny-Oppenheim measure, k(H,E) = Pr(E|H)−Pr(E|¬H)
Pr(E|H)+Pr(E|¬H)
Note that the domain of a confirmation measure strictly speaking consists of
triples, (H,E, Pr); however, for simplicity I will for the most part suppress mention
of Pr. It is well known that confirmation measures do not always order hypothesis-
evidence pairs in the same way: the measures are sometimes ordinally non-equivalent.
1From now on I will suppress mention of the background theory.
2Equivalently, if and only if Pr(H|E) > Pr(H|¬E) or if and only if Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|¬H).
Disconfirmation and absence of confirmation (neutrality) can be defined analogously.
3Of course, PrK is assumed to be a probability distribution defined on a Boolean algebra of
propositions that includes both H and E.
4It is not customary to specify the base of the logarithm.
5This measure is also sometimes called the ”Joyce-Christensen measure,” after Joyce (1999) and
Christensen (1999)
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For instance, confirmation measures r and d are ordinally non-equivalent since they
differ in how they rank certain hypothesis-evidence pairs.6,7 It is obvious that two
confirmation measures that are ordinally non-equivalent ought not be considered the
same confirmation measure. In other words, the following is uncontroversial:
The Ordinal Non-Equivalence Thesis : If two confirmation measures are
ordinally non-equivalent, then the two confirmation measures are not the
same confirmation measure.
I have called the ordinal non-equivalence thesis a “thesis,” but perhaps it is more
appropriate to call it a truism. The task of this paper will be to investigate the
converse of the non-equivalence thesis. Namely,
The Ordinal Equivalence Thesis : If two confirmation measures are ordi-
nally equivalent, then they are the same confirmation measure.
According to the ordinal equivalence thesis (OET), r and lr are the same confir-
mation measure since, even though they have differing functional forms, they rank
all hypothesis-evidence pairs in the same order. The ordinal equivalence thesis has
arguably become a widespread tacit – and sometimes explicit – commitment among
philosophers who work on Bayesian confirmation theory. For example, Branden Fi-
telson writes:
“If two relevance measures are ordinally equivalent, then, as far as we are
concerned, they are identical. So, when we say ‘according to c’, we really
mean ‘according to any measure ordinally equivalent to c”’ (Fitelson,
2007, p. 7n7).
Other philosophers reveal their commitment to OET by treating ordinally equiva-
lent measures as interchangeable, which is only legitimate given OET.8 For example,
David Glass and Mark McCartney write:
6Example: Pr(H) = 0.1, Pr(H|E) = 0.9, Pr(H ′) = 0.01, Pr(H ′|E) = 0.5. Here H is better
confirmed than H ′ according to d, but H ′ is better confirmed than H according to r.
7Interestingly, the standard measures do correlate fairly well (Tentori et al., 2007).
8Numerous conversations I have had with philosophers who work on Bayesian confirmation
theory have convinced me that it is standard for philosophers to regard ordinally equivalent measures
as interchangeable in general.
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“l satisfies (C4) provided division by zero is equated with infinity. To
avoid this, the ordinally equivalent measure proposed by Kemeny and
Oppenheim (1952) can be used instead.” (Glass and McCartney 2015,
p62n4.)
Still other philosophers do not unconditionally commit to the ordinal equivalence
thesis, but hold that ordinally equivalent measures often are interchangeable. For
example, Tomoji Shogenji writes that, “For many purposes, ordinally equivalent
measures are essentially the same measure” (Shogenji, 2012, p. 5n4). Shogenji may
be right that ordinal equivalence suffices for many purposes, but a major goal of this
paper is to show that there are also several purposes for which the ordinal equivalence
thesis is too weak.
Here is the plan of the paper. In Section 2, I describe various competing theses
that we may choose to adopt; each of these theses corresponds to an alternative level
of analysis that we may choose to prioritize. In Section 3, I show the shortcomings
of the ordinal equivalence thesis by contrasting it with alternative theses, and in
particular I show that adopting the ordinal equivalence thesis renders one unable to
set various thresholds that can be used to interpret a set of confirmation scores, and
that a thesis stronger than OET must be adopted if merely ordinal conclusions are to
be drawn from the expected values of a confirmation measure. In Section 4, I show
that several arguments given by philosophers already rely on a rejection of OET. In
Section 5, I discuss possible reasons why OET has been accepted. A major reason
why philosophers have focused on the ordinal level is probably because a rejection
of OET seems to imply that human beings have epistemic states that have a very
fine-grained quantitative structure. However, I suggest that the normative upshot of
the paper has a conditional form, so that it is only applicable when the antecedent
of the conditional applies. I furthermore suggest that other Bayesian norms can
fruitfully be understood as having a similar conditional form.
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2 Formal characterizations of various equivalence
conventions
As is well known in the literature, ordinal equivalence can be formally characterized.
More precisely, two confirmation measures are ordinally equivalent if and only if
there is a strictly increasing function from each measure to the other. We can state
the preceding characterization of ordinal equivalence more formally as follows:
Ordinal equivalence characterization: Confirmation measures c and c′ are
ordinally equivalent if and only if there is a strictly increasing function,
f , such that, for all H and E and all probability distributions over H
and E, c(H,E) = f(c′(H,E)).
To better understand the ordinal equivalence thesis, it is useful to contrast it
with alternative theses that we may instead choose to adopt. Inspired by the above
characterization of ordinal equivalence, we can use the following abstract schema to
derive alternative equivalence theses:
Confirmation Equivalence Schema: Confirmation measures c and c′ are
equivalent if and only if there is an invertible function, f , such that
c = f(c′).
Different confirmation equivalence theses can then be characterized by what re-
quirements they put on f . In theory, we could produce infinitely many theses from
the above schema since there are potentially infinitely many requirements we could
choose to put on f . Certain theses are of more theoretical interest than others, how-
ever. Following Stevens (1946), I will call the theses I consider “ordinal,” “interval,”
“ratio,” and “absolute,” where these theses are distinguished by the increasingly
strong demands they place on f .
Ordinal Equivalence Thesis (OET): The requirement on f is that it be
strictly increasing.
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Interval Equivalence Thesis (IET): The requirement on f is that it be
strictly increasing and linear.
Ratio Equivalence Thesis (RET): The requirement on f is that it be
strictly increasing and linear with constant term 0.
Absolute Equivalence Thesis (AET): The requirement on f is that it be
the identity function.
Adopting OET amounts to carving the set of all possible confirmation measures
into classes of ordinally equivalent measures and treating the measures in each class as
interchangeable. Similarly, IET and RET carve the space of confirmation measures
into classes of measures that are what we might respectively call “interval” and
“ratio” equivalent. The fourth thesis, AET, is the strongest possible thesis: its
equivalence classes contain only a single confirmation measure each.
My choice of singling out the above four theses is not arbitrary. The first three
theses correspond to three of the four “levels of measurement” outlined by Stevens
(1946) in the context of scientific measurement. As Stevens points out, the strength
of the conclusions one is licensed to draw from data depends on the strength of the
measurement scale used. What is true in the case of measurement scales is also true
in the case of confirmation measures, as I show in the next section when I discuss the
consequences of adopting OET by contrasting it with the consequences of instead
adopting IET.
3 Consequences of adopting the ordinal equiva-
lence thesis
In the following two subsections, I discuss general consequences associated with
adopting OET and treating confirmation measures as mere ordinal measures. In
Section 4, I show why these consequences matter for several of the arguments and
applications of confirmation measures that have been discussed in the literature.
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3.1 Interpreting a set of confirmation scores
Suppose I give you the results of a 100m race with three runners by listing the order
in which the runners finished. Then you are not entitled to say that the difference
in performance between the winner and the runner-up is roughly the same as the
difference in performance between the runner-up and the third-place finisher; nor
may you conclude that the winner performed substantially better than the other
two runners. The ordinal data with which you have been provided simply does not
contain this information. Suppose you learn, however, that the winner is Usain Bolt
and that the other two runners are recreational runners. Then you have reason to
believe that the winner’s performance was in fact much better than the performance
of the other two runners. If, on the other hand, you learn that all three runners
are recreational runners, you no longer have any reason to think that the winner’s
performance was substantially better than the performance of the other two runners.
Thus, if all you learn about the three competitors are their ordinal ranks, you cannot
draw conclusions about their performance relative to each other. You can only infer
such conclusions on the basis of further information.
But now suppose that you instead learn the times of the three runners. Suppose,
for instance, that you learn that the winner’s time was 10 seconds while the other two
runners finished in 14 and 14.5 seconds. Then you really can say that the winner was
substantially better than the other two runners, and moreover you can say that the
two losers performed about equally well. To be sure, your conclusions still depend
on background knowledge about running and about the time scale used, but the
conclusions you are entitled to draw are much more robust than in the case where
you are just given ordinal ranks in the sense that the conclusions do not depend
sensitively on knowledge about the particular runners.
The above example illustrates the differences between ordinal and interval/ratio
scales. If we adopt OET, then the proper way to interpret the numerical outputs
of confirmation measures is as ranks. Although the outputs of e.g. the log-ratio
measure lr can be any real number, only the ordinal properties of the real numbers
are being used. Suppose, for instance, that our favored confirmation measure — call
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it “m” — outputs the three numbers 0.91, 0.9, and 0.1 for evidence-hypothesis pairs
(H,E), (H ′, E), and (H ′′, E), respectively. In that case we are entitled to say that
E confirms H more than H ′, and that E confirms H ′ more than H ′′, but we cannot
say that H ′ and H ′′ are confirmed to approximately the same degree by E, or that
each is much more highly confirmed than H ′′. To make any of these claims is to go
beyond the merely ordinal properties of 0.91, 0.9, and 0.1.
Indeed, if we adopt OET, then any conclusion we draw from m’s output is valid
only if it still holds when we choose to use a different ordinally equivalent measure.
This is because by adopting OET we agree to treat ordinally equivalent measures
as interchangeable. But it is easy to transform our m into an ordinally equivalent
measure that instead outputs, say, the numbers 3, 2, and 1 for the above three
evidence-hypothesis pairs. All one needs to do is device a suitable strictly increasing
function. For example, g(x) = 1.25x + 0.875 for x ≤ 0.9, and g(x) = 100x − 88
for x > 0.9. Of course, g is not a very “natural” function, but that is beside the
point. The point is that g is a strictly increasing (even continuous) function that
transforms m into m′; therefore, by OET, m and m′ are equivalent confirmation
measures. Performing the preceding transformation makes it clear that the only
conclusion we are justified in drawing from the data is the ordinal ranking itself,
m(H,E) > m(H ′, E) > m(H ′′, E).
The situation is different if we adopt one of the other equivalence theses. Suppose
we adopt IET instead. Then any other confirmation measure in the same equivalence
class as m must be of the form m′ = am + b, with positive a. Thus, it must be the
case that:
m(H,E)−m(H ′, E)
m(H ′, E)−m(H ′′, E) =
m′(H,E)−m′(H ′, E)
m′(H ′, E)−m′(H ′′, E) (1)
In other words, any functional transformation of m allowed by IET preserves
relative interval sizes. The consequence of this is that while a measure outputting
0.91, 0.90, and 0.1 can be transformed into an interval equivalent measure that
instead outputs the values 91, 90, and 10, respectively, it is not possible to transform
it into a measure that outputs 3, 2, and 1. Thus, if we have narrowed down the range
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of confirmation measures to a class of interval equivalent measures and we adopt
IET, then we are entitled to draw robust conclusions from the distances between the
numbers outputted by our measure. If we adopt IET, then we are no longer merely
using the ordinal properties of the real numbers — the difference between 0.91 and
0.9 really is smaller than the difference between 0.9 and 0.1.
3.1.1 Setting thresholds with IET
But the fact that interval equivalent confirmation measures preserve relative interval
sizes does not yet mean that we are able to conclude that, e.g., H and H ′ are
confirmed to roughly the same degree by E. In order to draw a conclusion of this kind,
we need specific knowledge about m’s behavior that allows us to determine that H
and H ′ are confirmed to roughly the same degree (by E and E ′ respectively; of course
E and E ′ may be identical) if and only if |m(H,E)−m(H ′, E ′)| < δ, for some (small)
δ. In the same way, we can establish a threshold that says that H is substantially
better confirmed by E than is H ′ by E ′ if and only if m(H,E) −m(H ′, E ′) >  for
some suitably chosen .
Royall (1997, p. 11) does the preceding for the likelihood ratio, Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H2).9
He considers the following “canonical experiment”: suppose an urn contains either
all white balls or else an equal number of white and black balls. Suppose you then
draw three balls with replacement and all the balls turn out to be white. Intuitively,
this seems to be “pretty strong” evidence that all the balls are white rather than
that half of them are black. The likelihood ratio favoring all white balls is in this
case 8. Thus, Royall concludes, 8 is the threshold that signifies “pretty strong” evi-
dence (in an everyday context, let us add) favoring one hypothesis over another. Of
course, the choice of this particular canonical experiment is somewhat arbitrary, but
note that the particular choice of canonical experiment does not matter much if we
9Note: the likelihood ratio is not a Bayesian measure of confirmation. Rather, it is a direct
measure of the evidential support that one hypothesis enjoys vis-a-vis another one. As Fitelson
(2007) points out, the standard Bayesian confirmation measure that agrees with using the likelihood
ratio to compare the relative support of two hypotheses is the ratio measure. Thus, implicitly, Royall
is setting thresholds for interpreting quantities of the form r(H,E)r(H′,E) .
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accept IET. A different canonical experiment may have instead yielded 7 or 9, say,
as the threshold that signifies “pretty strong” or maybe just “strong” evidence. But
fortunately the real numbers 7 and 9 are relatively close to each other, and when we
adopt IET we make use of these facts about the real numbers. Therefore, nothing
significant hinges on choosing either 7 or 8 or 9 as the threshold.
The precise values of the thresholds are therefore not important — in fact, the
thresholds ought not be treated too precisely; what a set of thresholds allows us
to do is to better interpret a set of confirmation scores. Importantly, IET allows
us to use the same threshold throughout the whole confirmation scale. That is
because IET implies that the difference m(H,E)−m(H ′, E ′) has the same meaning
(i.e. describes the same difference in confirmation) regardless of where on the scale
m(H,E) and m(H ′, E ′) happen to be. This is exactly what (1) guarantees will be
the case. And the fact that m(H,E)−m(H ′, E ′) = a describes the same difference
in confirmation regardless of the values of m(H,E) and m(H ′, E ′) allows us to say,
given the confirmation scores of two hypotheses, whether the two hypotheses are
confirmed to essentially the same degree, or whether one of the hypotheses is better
confirmed, or much better confirmed, than the other one.
It is important to appreciate the importance of being able to make these kinds
of comparisons between m(H,E) and m(H ′, E). Indeed, the question of whether a
piece of evidence confirms one hypothesis more than it confirms another hypothesis
is essentially uninformative unless we can also at the very least determine whether
the difference in confirmation is substantial or trivial. Indeed, even if we are ulti-
mately mostly interested in the ordinal ranking provided by the confirmation mea-
sure, having confirmation scores that are at least on an interval scale prevents us
from over-interpreting a difference in confirmation score between two hypotheses.
If m(H,E) > m(H ′, E), then E confirms H more than it confirms H ′, but if the
difference between the confirmation scores is small, the inequality may be practically
insignificant, especially when measurement error is taken into account: that is, the
inherent accuracy of our measurement procedure may be such that, had we repeated
our measurement, the new E ′ could easily be such that m(H,E ′) < m(H ′, E).
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3.1.2 Setting thresholds without IET?
IET allows us to set thresholds that determine, e.g. whether H and H ′ are confirmed
to roughly the same degree by some piece of evidence. Are there equivalence theses
weaker than IET that allow us to do the same thing?
In general, in order to make an assessment of the “distance” between two con-
firmation scores, we need a function that takes as its input two confirmation scores
and outputs a (non-negative) number that represents the distance between the two
scores. Suppose we have available some such function, D. In order for us to be able
to set up a threshold δ according to which x and y are “approximately equal” if and
only if D(x, y) < δ, it needs to be the case that D(x, y) = a means the same thing
regardless of what x and y happen to be. Thus, in particular, if D(x, y) = a and
D(z, w) = a, then it should be the case that the distance D(x, y) means the same
thing as the distance D(z, w), so that we can say that D(x, y) = D(z, w). In order
for this to be the case, the class of admissible transformations must obey something
very analogous to (1). More precisely, in order for it to be legitimate to conclude
that D(x, y) = D(z, w) from the fact that D(x, y) = a and D(z, w) = a, it needs to
be the case that D(f(x), f(y)) = D(f(z), f(w)) whenever x, y, z, and w are trans-
formed using any admissible transformation f . Hence, the class of all admissible







Thus, given a distance measure D, we can say that two confirmation scores are
approximately equal, or that one confirmation score is substantially greater than
another confirmation score only if we adopt an equivalence thesis according to which
only transformations that obey (2) are admissible. Now, given very weak conditions
on D, the class of transformations that obey (2) will be a proper subset of the class
of all strictly increasing functions.10 It follows that OET will in general will be too
weak to set thresholds. In order for us to be able say anything more specific about
10There are several conditions we could put on D. For example, one reasonable requirement is
that confirmation measures scores can be arbitrarily close to each other according to D.
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how strong of an equivalence thesis is required, more specific assumptions must be
made about the distance measure, D.
The most natural and simplest distance measure on the real numbers is arguably
the absolute distance metric, D(x, y) = |x−y|. If we plug the absolute distance metric
into (2) we recover (1). Furthermore, the linear functions are the only functions that
obey (1); therefore, all admissible transformations must be linear.11 It follows that
IET is the weakest thesis that allows us to set thresholds of the sort discussed above,
provided the distance measure is the absolute value metric. If some other distance
measure is used, then some other thesis than IET may instead (indeed, probably
must) be adopted. But in any case, OET is too weak, because any comparison
of confirmation scores requires a distance measure, and the distance measure will
impose the requirement that the admissible transformations obey (2).
3.2 Taking expectations of confirmation measures
As we shall see later, several applications of Bayesian confirmation theory involve
calculating the mathematical expectation of some confirmation measure. In general,
the expected value of some quantity (random variable), x, that can take values x1,
x2, . . . , xn, relative to a probability distribution p, is defined as follows: E[x] =∑
i xip(xi).
Taking the expectation of a confirmation measure presupposes that the confir-
mation measure is not interpreted as a mere ordinal measure, even if we only care
about the ordinal properties of the expectation. This is because the fact that two
confirmation measures are ordinally equivalent does not entail that their expectations
will be ordinally equivalent.
To see why this is the case, suppose more generally that we are interested in
the expected value of quantities, x, y, z, etc. What kind of scale must x, y, z, etc.
be on in order for us to be able to draw the ordinal conclusion that, for example,
E[x] ≥ E[y]? Clearly, in order for us to be able to draw the conclusion that the
expected value of x really is greater than or equal to the expected value of y, it must
11The proof that only linear functions obey (1) is trivial and omitted.
12
be the case that, for every admissible transformation, f , of x and y, it is also the case
that E[f(x)] ≥ E[f(y)]. Hence, in order for us to draw merely ordinal conclusions
from the expected values of x and y, the class of admissible transformations must
satisfy the following requirement:
E[x] ≥ E[y] =⇒ E[f(x)] ≥ E[f(y)] (3)
But the class of all strictly increasing functions does not satisfy the above re-
quirement.12 In general, if f is a strictly increasing function, then the following will
of course be true:
E[x] ≥ E[y] =⇒ f(E[x]) ≥ f(E[y]) (4)
However, (4) does not entail (3) unless the following condition also holds:
f(E[x]) ≥ f(E[y]) =⇒ E[f(x)] ≥ E[f(y)] (5)
But there are many strictly increasing functions that violate (5). Hence x, y, z
cannot be on a mere ordinal scale even if we want to draw merely ordinal conclusions
from their expected values. In general, we can guarantee that (5) (and therefore also
(3)) holds if the class of admissible transformations satisfies the following require-
ment:
f(E[x]) = E[f(x)] (6)
As it happens, the class of linear functions satisfies (6). Hence, if x, y, and z
are on an interval scale, then that is sufficient for us to be able to draw ordinal
conclusions from their expected values.13
12Here is a simple counter-example. Suppose we have the following probabilities: p(H1) = 0.5,
p(H1|E) = 0.6, p(H1|¬E) = 0.2, p(E) = 0.625, p(H2) = 0.4, p(H2|E) = 0.2, p(H2|¬E) = 0.7333.
As can be verified, we have: E[d(H1, E)] = 0 = E[d(H2, E)]. However, E[d(H1, E)
3] < E[d(H2, E)
3].
Note that this example assumes that H1 and H2 are not exhaustive hypotheses; i.e., there must be
at least one other hypothesis, H3, etc. in the partition of hypotheses.
13Indeed, under several reasonable conditions, the class of linear functions is the only class that
satisfies (6).
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4 Applications of Bayesian confirmation measures
that rely on a rejection of OET
As I pointed out in Section 1, many philosophers have adopted OET, either explicitly
or implicitly. However, there are also many examples in the literature of applications
of Bayesian confirmation theory that implicitly rely on a rejection of OET. To the
extent that one wants to make arguments of the sort discussed in this section, one
must therefore reject OET.
4.1 Case 1: Schlesinger’s argument against the difference
measure
In Section 3.1, I explained that adopting OET prevents one from being able to set
thresholds that can be used to determine whether a given degree of confirmation is
strong, moderate or insignificant. As it happens, there are examples of arguments
in the literature that implicitly rely on the assumption that such thresholds can be
set. In particular, (Schlesinger, 1995, p. 211) presents an argument (repeated and
endorsed in Zalabardo (2009)) against the difference measure and in favor of the ratio
measure of confirmation. The argument asks us to compare a change in probability
from 1/109 to 1/100 with a change from 0.26 to 0.27. According to Schlesinger and
Zalabardo, the first probability shift is intuitively “much greater” than the second
one. The ratio measure gets the “right” verdict here, but the difference measure does
not. As the argument in Section 3.1 shows, Schlesinger and Zalabardo cannot say
that the ratio measure judges the shift from 1/109 to 1/100 to be “much greater”
than the shift from 0.26 to 0.27 unless the ratio measure is interpreted as something
more than just an ordinal measure. Schlesinger and Zalabardo are consequently
tacitly rejecting OET.
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4.2 Case 2: Myrvold’s Bayesian account of the virtue of
unification
In Section 3.1, I also explained that OET prevents one from being able to say that
two confirmation scores are “approximately the same”; only confirmation theses at
least as strong as IET enable one to say this (if the absolute distance metric is used
to measure distance). However, there are arguments in the literature that rely on
the assumption that it is legitimate to talk about two confirmation scores being ap-
proximately the same. In particular, Myrvold (2003) (or, more recently, Myrvold
(2016)) gives a Bayesian account that purports to show how a unifying hypothe-
sis can sometimes be confirmed more by evidence than a non-unifying hypothesis,
and he applies his account to several examples. Myrvold’s explanation of the exam-
ples relies on the use of both a confirmation measure, c, and a measure of unifica-
tion U , and he requires that the measures jointly exhibit the following property: If
c(H1, E1) ≈ c(H2, E1), c(H1, E2) ≈ c(H2, E2), and U(E1, E2;H1) > U(E1, E2;H2),
then c(H1, E1&E2) > c(H2, E1&E2). As argued earlier, the use of approximation
signs requires that the confirmation measures not be interpreted as mere ordinal
measures. Myrvold’s account can be salvaged even with OET if the approximation
signs are replaced by equality signs. But in that case the unrealistic assumption must
be made that H1 and H2 are independently confirmed to exactly the same degree by
the evidence.
The next case I will consider comes from Fitelson (1999). Fitelson shows how
several arguments given in the literature are sensitive to the choice of confirmation
measure because the arguments depend crucially on properties that some measures
have but others lack. According to Fitelson, the problem is that these arguments rely
on properties that vary between ordinally non-equivalent measures. In the following,
I will show that one of the arguments also implicitly relies on a rejection of OET.
4.3 Case 3: The Gillies-Popper-Miller argument
Gillies’s (1986) reconstruction of an argument due to Popper and Miller (1983) de-
pends on the confirmation measure used having the following decomposition prop-
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erty: c(H,E) = c(H ∨ E,E) + c(H ∨ ¬E,E).14 According to Gillies, this decompo-
sition allows us to neatly separate H’s confirmation score into a deductive part and
an inductive part. Redhead (1985) points out that not all measures have the preced-
ing decomposition property, and Fitelson (1999) notes that the Gillies-Popper-Miller
argument is consequently sensitive to the choice of confirmation measure. More
precisely, Redhead points out that the confirmation measure r does not have the
decomposition property. Gillies responds to Redhead’s criticism by claiming that r
is a flawed confirmation measure, and that d, which does have the decomposition
property, is better. In response, Fitelson points out that l also lacks the decomposi-
tion property. Presumably, Gillies could respond to Fitelson by claiming that l, too,
is a flawed measure of confirmation. However, we can make the further observation
that there are measures ordinally equivalent to d that do not have the preceding
decomposition property. For example, the measure d3, which of course is ordinally
equivalent to d, does not have the decomposition property. Thus, Gillies’s argument
does not merely rely on d’s being better than r and l; it implicitly relies on d3’s
not being a good measure of confirmation. Since d and d3 are ordinally equivalent,
Gillies’s argument is implicitly rejecting OET. More generally, the preceding discus-
sion shows that the decomposition property is not necessarily shared by confirmation
measures that are ordinally equivalent. Hence, anyone who proposes an argument
that relies on the decomposition property will quite likely have to reject OET.
The next case I will consider concerns how the Paradox of the Ravens has been
handled in the literature.
4.4 Case 4: Solutions to the Paradox of the Ravens
The Paradox of the Ravens is a paradoxical conclusion that arises from the combina-
tion of two very reasonable premises: Nicod’s Criterion and the Equivalence Condi-
tion. Nicod’s Criterion says that universal generalizations of the form ∀x(Ax→ Bx)
are confirmed by instances of the form Ac&Bc. The Equivalence Condition says
that if e confirms S, then e confirms every sentence logically equivalent to S. To-
14I thank a referee for helpful comments on this paragraph.
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gether, the Equivalence Condition and Nicod’s Criterion entail a conclusion that
seems counter-intuitive, namely that a non-black non-raven confirms the proposition
that every raven is black. Since Nicod’s Criterion and the Equivalence Condition
are widely accepted, the standard solution15 is to embrace the paradoxical conclu-
sion while explaining it away by conceding that a non-black non-raven confirms the
proposition that every raven is black, but only to a “minute degree” (Vranas, 2004)
in ordinary circumstances.
Standard solutions that have been given to the Paradox of the Ravens clearly
violate OET. For example, Fitelson and Hawthorne (2004, pp. 31-7) give a quanti-
tative solution that depends crucially on the non-ordinal properties of the likelihood
ratio, l. In particular, their Theorem 4 (p. 34) gives a bound on the ratio of two like-
lihood ratios that can be violated if we transform the two likelihoods into ordinally
equivalent measures by the method I used earlier on p. 8.
In general, quantitative solutions to the Paradox of the Ravens inevitably re-
ject OET. However, there are also non-quantitative solutions to the Paradox of the
Ravens. These solutions have the more modest goal of showing that a non-black
non-raven confirms the proposition that all ravens are black less than a black raven
does, without making the quantitative claim that the confirmation is much less.
Since these solutions only make ordinal claims, they do not rely on a violation of
OET. However, a proper solution to the Paradox of the Ravens arguably should be
quantitative. As an analogy, suppose I ask you why the sun looks the size of a tennis
ball even though it is so far away, while a tennis ball looks tiny from just 100 yards
away. If you answer that it is because the sun is bigger than a tennis ball, you have
given me relevant information, but you have not really provided an adequate expla-
nation. Similarly, our intuition in the Paradox of the Ravens is that a non-black
non-raven should (in most circumstances) barely, if at all, confirm the proposition
that all ravens are black, or at least that it should confirm this proposition much
less than a black raven does. A proper solution to the Paradox of the ravens should
entail this conclusion, and therefore cannot be just ordinal.
15Which, of course, is not the only solution. See Rinard (2014) for instance.
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4.5 Case 5: The use of mathematical expectations
Several uses to which confirmation measures have been put rely on taking expected
values of confirmation measures. Here I will discuss just two such applications.16
First, a confirmation score tells you how much a piece of evidence confirms a
single hypothesis. However, it’s also often interesting to know how much the evi-
dence influences the whole partition of hypotheses; or, in other words, how big the
divergence is between the posterior distribution and the prior distribution, given the
evidence. The natural way to generalize a confirmation measure to a divergence





c(Hj, E) ∗ p(Hj|E) (7)
Plugging different confirmation measures into (7) then gives rise to different di-
vergence measures. For example, plugging in the log-ratio measure gives rise to the
well known KL divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951). Conversely, any divergence
measure may be regarded as an implicit generalization of a confirmation measure.
Divergence measures such as the KL divergence have been applied in many ways in
the Bayesian literature. For example, they form the foundations of one of the most
prominent versions of objective Bayesianism (Bernardo, 1979).
Crucially, confirmation measures that are ordinally equivalent will in general not
give rise to divergence measures that are ordinally equivalent, for the reasons given
in Section 3.2. Indeed, ordinally equivalent confirmation measures can give rise to
very different divergence measures. Consider, for example, the log-likelihood measure
and the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure. These are ordinally equivalent, but the log-
likelihood measure judges distances between probabilities that are close to 0 or 1 to be
much larger than does the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure, because the log-likelihood
measure is unbounded while the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure is bounded between
0 and 1. Thus, the log-likelihood measure and the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure
16For examples of other applications, see Good (1985).
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give rise to divergence measures that will often ordinally disagree if the probabilities
involved are extreme (close to 0 or close to 1).17 Hence, if we want to be able to draw
merely ordinal conclusions from Bayesian divergence measures, we cannot treat the
confirmation measures on which they are based as mere ordinal measures.
Second, as has recently been pointed out by Bro¨ssel and Huber (2014), confirma-
tion measures also have an application in experimental design. More precisely, from
a Bayesian point of view, the best experiment to conduct is the one that can be ex-
pected to have the greatest onfirmational impact, where the expectation is calculated
over the prior probabilities of the possible evidence, given the candidate experimen-
tal design. The confirmation measure that is standardly used (implicitly) for this
purpose in the literature on Bayesian experimental design is the log-ratio measure.
Bro¨ssel and Huber instead use as their illustration the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure
of confirmation. I. J. Good, on the other hand, advocated using the log-likelihood
measure for the same purpose (Good, 1985). Interestingly, as was just pointed out,
the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure and the log-likelihood measure are ordinally equiv-
alent, and are for that reason generally regarded as equivalent in the philosophical
literature. However, as we have seen, the fact that the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure
and the log-likelihood measure are ordinally equivalent does not imply that their
expectations will be ordinally equivalent; hence, the experiment that maximizes ex-
pected confirmation with respect to the log-likelihood measure will in general not
be equivalent to the experiment that maximizes expected confirmation with respect
to the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure—let me hasten to add that neither Bro¨ssel and
Huber nor Good claim that the expectations of these measures are equivalent.
5 Methodological and Concluding Remarks
Carnap (1962) first drew the distinction between the “comparative” and “quantita-
tive” questions of confirmation. As the previous sections make clear, we can draw
finer distinctions than that. In particular, the interval level occupies an intermediate
17Numerical examples are easy to come up with, but tedious. Note also that if there are many
hypotheses, then at least some of the probabilities must be small.
19
position between the merely comparative (ordinal level) and the fully quantitative
(ratio level). For whatever reason, the comparative question analyzed on the ordinal
level has become the question that occupies philosophers’ attention. Why is that?
One possibility is that some philosophers simply believe the ordinal level to be the
most interesting level of analysis. I do not think this belief is warranted, but even
if it is granted, the arguments in the previous sections show that the quantitative
levels of analysis are by no means uninteresting. Several well known arguments that
make use of confirmation measures implicitly rely on a rejection of OET. Moreover,
many conclusions that we want to draw from the output of a confirmation measure
may only be legitimately drawn if the measure is assumed to be more than a mere
ordinal measure.
A different reason why philosophers may have focused on the ordinal level of
analysis is that they think the question of which confirmation is ordinally correct
must be settled before the more fine-grained question of which confirmation measure
has the right quantitative structure can be approached. Although this idea seems
intuitive, it is mistaken. Indeed, if we instead start with the desideratum that we
want a confirmation measure that we can interpret as, say, an interval measure and
not just an ordinal measure, then that puts significant restrictions on the functional
form that the confirmation measure can take, as argued in Vassend (2015).
Indeed, focusing on the interval level leads to a very different perspective on
confirmation measures. By definition, each class of interval equivalent confirmation
measures is a proper subset of a class of ordinally equivalent measures; but even
so, it is possible for two ordinally non-equivalent confirmation measures to exhibit
quantitative behavior that is more similar than the quantitative behavior exhibited by
two measures that are ordinally equivalent. For example, from a quantitative point
of view, the log-likelihood measure and the log-ratio measure are arguably “more
similar” to each other than the log-likelihood measure is to the Kemeny-Oppenheim
measure, even though the latter two measures are ordinally equivalent and the first
two are not, because the log-likelihood measure and the log-ratio measure will often
have numerically similar outputs.18 One consequence of this is that the log-ratio
18In particular, if the hypothesis space is large, it will generally be the case that p(E|¬H) ≈ p(E),
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and log-likelihood measures arguably give rise to divergence measures that are more
similar to each other than are the divergence measures derived from the log-likelihood
measure and Kemeny-Oppenheim measure. Focusing only on the ordinal level of
analysis therefore leads us to neglect quantitative similarities and dissimilarities that
cut across ordinally equivalent classes.
A final probable reason why philosophers have focused their attention on the or-
dinal level of analysis and have implicitly accepted OET is that many philosophical
Bayesians are subjective Bayesians who hold that an agent’s probability function is
supposed to represent the degrees of belief of the agent. It is already controversial
whether agents’ degrees of belief have the kind of quantitative structure that prob-
ability functions have. Several philosophers have endorsed an “anti-realism” about
probabilistic representations of belief states (e.g. Easwaran (2016)).
To reject OET for confirmation measures is apparently to contend that agents’
epistemic states have an even more fine-grained structure than is attributed to agents
according to probabilism. If, for example, IET is accepted, then not only do rational
agents have degrees of belief that are representable by probabilities; all differences
between differences (according to some confirmation measure) of an agent’s prob-
ability function also represent actual features of the epistemic state of the agent.
For Bayesians who already worry about the psychological realism of probabilistic
degrees of belief, the complex structure seemingly attributed to agents’ epistemic
states according to IET may be a bridge too far.
On the other hand, it is undoubtedly the case that we sometimes do have quan-
titative intuitions about confirmation, so there is a basis in human epistemological
for most H’s, and hence the log-likelihood measure and log-ratio measure will have numerically
similar outputs. Indeed, if the hypothesis space is parameterized by a continuous parameter, Θ,
then, for every θ ∈ Θ, we have l(θ, E) = log Pr(E|θ)Pr(E|¬θ) = log Pr(E|θ)∫
Θ∗ Pr(E|θ)Pr(θ)dθ
, where Θ∗ is Θ
with θ taken out. But removing a single point from the parameter space will not have any effect





Pr(E|θ)Pr(θ)dθ = Pr(E). Therefore, l(θ,E) =
log Pr(E|θ)Pr(E|¬θ) = log
Pr(E|θ)
Pr(E) = lr(θ,E), and so l(θ,E) is actually identical to lr(θ,E) when the
hypothesis space is continuous. As far as I know, this fact has not been noted before. On the other
hand, the fact that the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure and the log-likelihood measure are ordinally
equivalent means that they will always agree on whether c(H,E) > c(H ′, E), but they will often
strongly disagree on whether the difference between c(H,E) and c(H ′, E) is small, large, or trivial;
their interval judgments are in other words quite different.
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experience for looking at the quantitative structure of confirmation measures. For
example, in the case of the paradox of the ravens, our intuition is that – in ordinary
circumstances – a non-black non-raven confirms the the proposition that all ravens
are black much less than a black raven does. And we often feel that a piece of
evidence fails to really discriminate between two hypotheses, so that the hypotheses
are intuitively confirmed to roughly the same extent.
Of course, the fact that we sometimes have strong quantitative intuitions about
confirmation does not mean we always do. But nor, should it be added, do we always
have strong ordinal intuitions. The Bayesian framework idealizes away these human
limitations, but the norms of Bayesianism presumably still hold for more limited
agents whenever the norms are applicable. Indeed, Bayesian norms, more generally,
can fruitfully be construed as conditional norms. For example, even though human
beings lack a completely ordered set of degrees of beliefs, Bayesian Dutch book
arguments tell you that, provided you do have degrees of belief and you intend to
use them in order to choose which bets to accept or reject, and you want to avoid
sure losses, then your degrees of belief need to be probabilistic. Accepting this norm
does not entail believing that your degrees of belief are always probabilistic or even
that it is always rationally required of you to have credences that are probabilistic.19
However, if you make it your goal to use a set of credences to choose how to act, then
accepting the norm implies you have to accept that the credences that are relevant
to your actions, at least, ought to be probabilistic.
Accuracy-based arguments for probabilism may reasonably be construed as es-
tablishing a similar conditional norm: if your goal is to have accurate credences in a
set of propositions, then your credences in those propositions need to be probabilis-
tic.20 But if you do not care about the truth value of some proposition, or you are
not attending to the proposition, then the conditional norm does not apply to you
with respect to that proposition.
In the same way, the arguments in this paper establish the following conditional
19Of course, many Bayesians want to argue for this stronger unconditional norm as well.
20Of course, philosophers often want to go further; they want to say, for example, that you ought
to have the goal of avoiding sure losses or having accurate credences.
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norm: if you have a set of confirmation scores and you intend to interpret the scores
in a certain way (e.g. to say that some of them are approximately the same) or use
them in a certain way (e.g. take their expectations), then your confirmation scores
cannot be on just an ordinal scale. This conditional norm only “kicks in” if you use
your confirmation measure in certain ways, and accepting the norm does not entail
believing that your confirmation judgments always will be or always ought to be
on an interval scale. The norm therefore does not make unrealistic presuppositions
about human psychology, nor does it make unreasonable demands.21
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